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Purpose - This study examines the agency problem of expropriation using dividends in 
politically connected firms and the relevance of institutional investors in limiting this problem. 
The growing presence of institutional investors offers a unique opportunity to test their roles 
in politically connected firms and its importance in the context of dividend payouts and 
expropriation. 
Design/methodology/approach- This study employs the Tobit regression to test the association 
between political connection, institutional investors and dividend payouts. Results are also 
robust to the three-stage-least squares regressions method.  
Findings – Based on a random sample of 2458 Malaysian firms-year observations for the 
period of 2004-2009. The results reveal that politically connected firms have an inclination to 
pay lower dividends, while institutional ownership are associated with higher dividend 
payouts. Furthermore, our findings reveal that higher levels of institutional ownership 
moderates the negative relationship between politically connected firms and dividends. 
Implications- Findings has an important implication to regulators as it suggests that the 
institutional investors can influence the dividends payout in politically connected firms through 
active monitoring and thus alleviating agency problems. This also provides a positive feedback 
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investors.   
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1. Introduction 
The importance of understanding the role of politically connected (PCON) firms in non-
Western economies has been spurred by their growth and subsequent importance in the last 
decade (Bliss & Gul, 2012a). In addition, interest on the influence of political connections in 
Asian countries is an ongoing topic that attracts researcher attention (Berkman & 
Galpoththage, 2016). Prior research that explore the role of political connections in 
organisation are extensive in scope and investigate the relationship between political 
connections with various financial outcomes.  For instance, these studies have looked at the 
association between political connection and audit fees during and after financial crisis (Gul, 
2006);  the roles of the audit committee and CEO duality in PCON firms (Bliss et al., 2011);the 
performance of PCON firms from the perspective of privatisation (Boubakri et al., 2008); the 
quality of accounting information in PCON firms (Chaney et al., 2011) and the role of political 
connections in determining the cost of debt and liquidity (Bliss & Gul 2012a; 2012b). 
However, what has not been studied is the behaviour of firms with political connections in the 
distribution of dividends, and how expropriation tendencies, if any, can be controlled by the 
institutional investors.   
Dividend payout is essentially a return to all shareholders in proportion to their 
ownership of shares, and it reduces cash available to firms that might otherwise be expropriated 
(Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000). In other words, dividend payment is a monitoring 
mechanism that restricts expropriation because it removes corporate wealth from insider 
control (Faccio et al., 2001). Agency theory posits that PCON firms may utilise their resources 
for the benefit of politically connected shareholders and insiders rather than for general 
shareholders (You & Du, 2012).  Prior studies suggest that the governance of these firms is 
opaque and it is an issue of concern for minority and other shareholders because controlling 
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shareholders may utilise opaque financial reporting to conceal their expropriation activities and 
impede prudent monitoring (Piotroski et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2011). This raises the question 
of whether political connections exacerbate the expropriation of firms’ resources at the expense 
of shareholders (i.e. by paying lower dividends).  
Empirical evidence provides several insights into dividend policy, specifically in relation 
to expropriation. Faccio et al. (2001) examine a sample of firms from Europe and Asia and 
find systematic expropriation by corporation at the base of extensive corporate pyramids. How 
et al. (2008) find that when divergence between ownership rights and control rights is large, 
firms in Hong Kong pay higher dividends to offset investors’ concerns about expropriation. 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) find that Australian family firms pay high dividends to allay 
concerns over expropriation of minority shareholders.  Overall, a firm’s dividend policy may 
reflect its agency problems and conflicts between insiders/shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Thus, an examination of the expropriation behaviour of PCON firms and whether 
their dividend policy reflects their expropriation motives is necessary.   
Institutional investors are another increasingly important factor in capital markets 
because  they have substantial influence in investee firms (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009; Grier & 
Zychowicz, 1994) and are active shareholders particularly in relation to monitoring firm 
management (Gillian & Starks, 2003; Karpoff, 2001). Empirical findings also suggest that 
agency problems between shareholders and managers may be mitigated by institutional 
investors since they hold large shareholdings (Gillian & Starks, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986), have expertise (Ferreira et al., 2010) and better firm-specific information (Edmans, 
2009). Institutional investors are also likely to be more concerned with high profitability and 
demonstrate a strong preference for higher dividend payouts (Ayers et al., 2011).  As such, it 
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is likely that the institutional investors will press upon higher dividend payouts to reduce 
expropriation activity especially in the PCON firms.  
Despite the availability of evidence documenting the influence of institutional investors 
on dividend policy in the context of firm wealth expropriation, there is still paucity in the 
literature on the influence of institutional investors in mitigating expropriation moves in PCON 
firms. Furthermore, evidence documenting the association between political connections and 
dividend payouts offer conflicting results.  For instance, while Su et al. (2014) report a positive 
association between political connections and dividends, Cao et al. (2012) document a negative 
association.   
In this paper, we extend this evolving line of research by examining the impact of 
political connections and institutional investors on dividend payouts.  While the political 
economy literature suggests that PCON firms are afflicted by agency problems (Boubakri et 
al., 2012; Faccio, 2006), there has yet to be a study that explore the effectiveness of the 
monitoring mechanism by institutional investors as a remedy for these agency problems 
(expropriation of wealth by PCON firms) particularly from the dividend payouts perspective. 
Malaysia is an ideal setting to explore this issue because political connections are a 
common phenomenon in the Malaysian capital market, with an immense influence on firm 
behaviour.  The proportion of public firms with political connections in Malaysia is one of the 
highest in the world (Faccio, 2006).1 As discussed above, these firms are highly opaque (How 
et al., 2014; Chaney et al. 2011), where the severity of agency problems are expected to be 
more pronounced in these firms due to the prevalence of political connection that may expose 
                                               
1  Faccio (2006) finds that Malaysia is the fourth highest country with PCON firms among sample firms.  PCON firms 
in Malaysia account for 28.24 % of the total market capitalization -. (see Faccio, 2006, p. 372). 
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institutional and other minority shareholders to problems of expropriation, especially in 
relation to  dividend payouts.  
 Based on a sample of 2458 firms-year observations from year 2004 to 2009, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between PCON firms and dividend payouts. As posited, 
we find a positive relationship between the fraction of institutional investors' shareholding 
(INS) and dividend payouts. Our findings also suggest that institutional investors positively 
moderate the negative association between PCON firms and dividends, which imply that the 
presence of institutional investors in the PCON firms reduces the agency problem within these 
firms. Delving further along agency theory arguments, our results differ according to firm’s 
levels of growth opportunity and cash holdings. In our attempt to differentiate overinvestment 
from other forms of expropriation of firms’ resources when dividend payout is lower, we find 
a negative association between political connection and CAPEX, a positive association between 
INS and CAPEX and a positive moderating effect by INS on the association between political 
connection and CAPEX. 
The remainder of the paper is set as follows. The next section discusses the institutional 
background in Malaysia, which later forms the basis for the development of our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and research method. The findings and conclusions are presented 
in Section 4 and Section 5 respectively. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1   Political Connections in Malaysia 
Political connections in Malaysian businesses are both ubiquitous and institutionalized, 
a reflection of and testament to a society that is deeply rooted in a culture of ethnic favouritism, 
wealth redistribution in the form of rent seeking, and affirmative policies intended to 
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economically empower the Bumiputras.2 In 1969, the government launched its New Economic 
Policy (NEP) with the objective of closing the economic gap among ethnic groups (Adhikari 
et al., 2006).  The implementation of NEP saw the active intervention by the Malaysian 
Government in the economy, which created opportunities for political patronage and crony 
capitalism in Malaysia (Bliss & Gul, 2012a; Gul 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). These firms 
are sponsored directly or indirectly by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) to 
acquire stakes in firms previously owned by the Chinese. Johnson and Mitton (2003) suggest 
that Bumiputra forms up to 65 per cent of the ‘primary connected major shareholder/director’ 
component of PCON firms in Malaysia and these PCON firms have special privileges whereby 
contracts are awarded by the government at favourable prices (Ebrahim et al., 2014), lighter 
taxation and relaxed regulatory oversight (Faccio, 2006), special access to inflows of local and 
foreign financing (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) and implicit guarantee of financial support that 
substantially reduces bankruptcy risks (Fraser et al., 2006).  
The selective favouritism shown to these firms has been documented as resulting in 
unfavourable outcomes. In particular, these firms have a higher likelihood of reporting a loss, 
are more likely to be charged higher interest rates by lenders (Bliss & Gul, 2012a), higher audit 
fees by auditors (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009), and suffered more than their non-PCON 
counterparts during the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 (Gul, 2006). PCON firms also ran 
into financial troubles and had to berescued by controversial government bailouts. 3   The 
                                               
2 The term Bumiputra or ‘sons of the soil’ was popularized during the 1920s and 1930s by the British colony to distinguish 
the indigenous people of Malaya (now Malaysia), the majority of whom are Malays, from the Chinese or Indian immigrants, 
the non-indigenous people.  
3 While capital controls and macroeconomic policies were deemed to be adequate in Malaysia, PCON firms were rescued 
without fear of punishment (Pepinsky, 2008). Faccio et al. (2006) report 17 out the 81 (21 percent) of bailed-out PCON firms 
came from Malaysia. In particular these connected firms had financial trouble and were bailed out by the Malaysian 
government. Some of the examples include; Renong-United Engineers Malaysia with a total of RM 2.34 billion in 1997 (and 
Malaysian Airlines System with a total of RM 7.41 billion (Jomo, 2006).  
. 
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general differences in macro-level economic, regulatory and social settings found in the 
Malaysian PCON firms are probably unique as compared to other international PCON firms, 
especially from a democratic-system point of view and there are different variations in 
institutional settings as well as capital market behaviour.4 The ruling coalition party (National 
Front), dominated by UMNO and MCA is the longest-serving elected ruling party in the world, 
so PCON firms have had an uninterrupted influence over and dominance in the corporate scene 
for more than 50 years. 5 In this regards, an examination of the roles of institutional investors 
under political patronage in relation to the distribution of dividend is a timely and indeed a 
testable notion.  
 
2.2 Institutional Investors in Malaysia  
The presence of institutional shareholders is moderate in Malaysia as compared to other 
developed countries. In 2009, the total institutional shareholding in Malaysia stood at 16.8% 
and has become an increasingly important market participant (How et al., 2014). The five 
largest public institutional investors in Malaysia are Employees Provident Fund (EPF), 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga 
Tabung Haji (LTH), and Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial (PERKESO). EPF and LTAT are 
pension funds, while PNB is a unit trust fund aiming to promote savings by Bumiputras. LTH 
is primarily a savings institution for Muslims to perform pilgrim in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, PERKESO is an insurance firm for all workers in Malaysia. Collectively, institutional 
investors contributed 76% of the total value of equities traded in Bursa Malaysia Exchange 
                                               
4 Bliss and Gul (2012a) find that Malaysian PCON firms are associated with higher cost of debt, however, the US study by 
Houston et al. (2014) documents contrasting evidence, which indicates that PCON firms in the US incur a lower cost of debt. 
5 PCON firms also include large shareholders or top executive including Managing Director, Vice President, CFO, CEO or 
board of directors that are closely related to UMNO and MCA (Ooi, 2011).  
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(Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange, 2014; Abdul Wahab et al., 2009).  By December 2013, Bursa 
Malaysia (2014) reported that institutional investors transacted 75% of the daily trading in the 
Bursa Malaysia Exchange.  
The Board and Investment Panel of Malaysia’s major institutional investors are 
appointed by and report directly to the Ministry of Finance. The onset of Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1998 has marked some changes in the direction by the Malaysian Government as the Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) was established to investigate the cause of the 
crisis and to provide some recommendations regarding the governance policies and practices 
in Malaysia.  Subsequently, based on the recommendations by the FCCG, the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG) known as “Green Book” was introduced in 2000.6  Most 
of the recommendations by the MCCG were adopted by the Bursa Listing Requirements and 
imposed upon all listed firms. In addition, FCCG made another important recommendations 
that has led to the establishment of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), 
whose main objective is “to monitor and combat abuses by insiders against the minority” 
(FCCG, Chapter 6 paragraph 9.1).  In August 2000, the MSWG was formally formed with five 
founding members representing the major Institutional investors in Malaysia. MSWG began 
operation in 2001.7  Since then the role of institutional investors has been strengthened. In 
2011, the Malaysian Securities Commission issues a recommendation on the corporate 
governance role of institutional investors. In particular, Recommendation 2.3.1 recommends 
that institutional investors should effectively exercise their ownership rights to ensure proper 
functioning of the board of directors, promoting transparency and information disclosure to the 
market. More recently in 2014, the Malaysian Code for institutional investors was introduced 
                                               
6 The MCCG was revised twice in 2007 and 2013 to further strengthen the business and governance practices in Malaysia 
7 The five top institutional investors are EPF, LTAT, PNB, LTH and SOCSO. 
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with aim to promote the leadership in governance and responsible ownership by institutional 
investors. The formulation of this industry-led Code is a recommendation made under the 
Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 and was spearheaded by MSWG and Securities 
Commission.  Indeed, this is a very important landmark in consolidating the role of institutional 
investors in Malaysia especially in mitigating agency problems in PCON firms. 
 
2.3   Hypotheses development 
2.3.1 Political connections and dividend payouts 
Faccio et al. (2001) asserted that the noticeable agency problem in East Asian countries 
like Malaysia is the expropriation of outside shareholders. PCON firms in Malaysia may be 
susceptible to expropriation risks and elevated levels of agency costs, given their business 
dealings and outcomes (Bliss et al., 2011; Bliss & Gul, 2012a; 2012b). Dividend distribution 
reduces the amount of free cash flow available for use at managers’ discretion (Jensen, 1986) 
and the rate at which firms pay dividends thus  gives an indication on insider expropriation 
(Faccio et al., 2001). The phenomenon of influential insiders or individuals is strongly 
prevalent in PCON firms in Malaysia where a leading individual has close ties to a top 
politician like the Prime Minister(See Gul (2006) Faccio (2006) for a detailed list of PCON 
firms, showing their respective primary connected shareholder/director and primary political 
connection ).8  In competing for wealth transfers from politicians or ministers, PCON firms 
may choose to offer political support in the form of money or donations to a politician or 
political party in exchange for government back-up, priority consideration for projects, or the 
                                               
8 This study adopts the definition of PCON firms mainly by Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) as the primary 
source to identify PCON firms used in this study. Faccio (2006) identifies a firm as PCON firms if its controlling shareholders 
or top directors including Managing Director, CEO, CFO have family or family ties with top politician or the ruling elite.  
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expectation that they will be bailed out by the government when facing financial distress 
(Faccio et al. 2006).9  Unless cash from profits is paid out as dividends, it may be diverted by 
powerful insiders (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) for personal benefit or invested in 
unprofitable projects that could channel private benefit to themselves. Furthermore, major 
shareholders or investors may be agreeable to low dividends as they can use the high trading 
activity of the firm’s stock as ‘backdoor’ profits to replace the dividends (Banerjee et al., 2007). 
Following this argument, it can be posited that:  
H1: PCON firms are associated with lower dividend payouts, ceteris paribus 
 
2.3.2. Institutional Investors and dividend payouts 
Dividend policy addresses agency problems between controlling owners and managers 
and outsiders (La Porta et al., 2000; Zwiebel, 1996). In countries with a common law system 
like Malaysia, minority shareholders have legal power to compel firms to disgorge cash, thus 
preventing insiders from diverting earnings for private benefit (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Institutional shareholders, compared with other types of non-controlling or minority 
shareholder, have a great incentive to monitor firms (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Evidence on the monitoring role of institutional investors in Malaysia has 
been rather consistent. Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) find a positive and significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm performance. Likewise, Abdul Wahab et al. (2009) 
indicate that auditor charge higher audit fees in firms with larger institutional ownership, 
                                               
9 Donation to political parties by PCON firms is outside the scope of study because such information are not publicly disclosed 
and fiercely guarded by restrictive laws in Malaysia.  See e.g. Sani (2011) which offers a glimpse of donations by corporations 
in Malaysian and the legal implications for publicly disclosing such information). Despite the void on the availability of 
information regarding the magnitude of donations by PCON firms, the existence of such donations is an open secret within 
the corporate circle in Malaysia. Empirical evidence (Aggarwal et al., 2007) suggests firms that donate to political parties have 
operating characteristics consistent with the existence of free cash flow problems (where these firms are reported to be larger, 
slowly growing and have higher free cash flows). Our descriptive statistics of PCON firms in Table 1 mirrors the operating 
characteristics mentioned here.  
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reflecting a demand for higher quality audit by the latter.  Institutional investors prefer free 
cash flow to be distributed in the form of dividends in order to reduce agency cost (Eckbo & 
Verma, 1994) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argue that if institutional shareholders are 
good monitors, there should be a positive relationship between dividend payouts and 
institutional shareholding. International studies (e.g., Barclay et al., 2009; Short et al., 2002) 
indicate that institutional shareholders are also positively associated with dividend payouts. 
Likewise, findings from two Malaysian studies derived the same conclusion (Leng, 2008; 
Ramli, 2010).  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: Firms with higher institutional shareholdings are associated with 
higher dividend payouts, ceteris paribus 
 
2.3.3 Political connections, Institutional Investors and dividend payouts 
The attributes of PCON firms have been extensively documented in the extant 
literature.10  Among the potential benefits of being PCON firms include having government 
influence to secure lucrative government contracts, imposing tariffs on competitors, incurring 
lower interests (Goldman et al., 2009); paying less taxes, hence lowering operating costs 
(Faccio, 2006); and not being sensitive to prevailing competition. Close ties to the government 
and politicians may be costly to shareholders, especially in PCON firms as the grabbing hand 
of governments and politicians might result in rent extraction of the firms’ resources by 
politicians (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Fyre & Shleifer, 1997). These negative traits in PCON 
firms increase agency costs and are detrimental to the minority shareholders.  
                                               
10 For extensive review of literature  on political connection in Malaysia (see  Gomez and Jomo ,1998; Faccio et al., 2001; 
Gomez, 2002; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006; Fraser et al al., 2006;  Faccio, 2006; Abdul Wahab et al. , 2009; Mitchell 
& Joseph, 2010; Bliss, Gul & Majid, 2011; Ebrahim et al, 2014; Bliss & Gul, 2012a; Bliss & Gul 2012b). 
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Prior studies suggest that institutional investors are monitoring mechanisms and facilitate 
savings based on consistent earnings and stable returns (Gomez & Jomo, 1999).  Abdul Wahab 
et al. (2009) find that PCON firms pay 1.005 percent more audit fees than non-politically 
connected firms when the institutional investors  are present. Collectively, these results indicate 
the institutional investors  are an effective   monitor in PCON firms and that, higher 
shareholdings of institutional investors in PCON firms are expected reduce the rent seeking/ 
expropriation behavior of PCON firms. 
In addition to the factors outlined above, ever since the Asian financial crisis, the role of 
institutional investors in Malaysia has changed dramatically whereby they are expected to play 
a much bigger role in the capital market in order to enhance good governance in firms (How 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, dividend policies can address the concerns of rationale 
investors over the higher risk of expropriation by insiders within a firm (Faccio et al., 2001). 
Additionally La Porta et al. (2000) find in a country like Malaysia with strong shareholder 
protection laws, minority and other shareholders are able to force upon higher dividends when 
the risk of expropriation is higher.  Institutional investors whilst wanting a share of the benefits 
obtainable from PCON firms might be assertive in forcing for higher dividends. In other words, 
it would be only logical for institutional investors to monitor the expropriation activity of the 
PCON firms and use their interest in the firms to force PCON firms to distribute their cash 
profits in the form of dividends, which otherwise might be used for purposes that are 
detrimental to the interest of outside shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Based on the 
notion that institutional investors act as a monitoring mechanism to monitor the expropriation 
behavior of PCON firms (reduce agency costs), we expect that higher proportion of 
institutional investors’ shareholding are likely to moderate the relationship between PCON 
firms and dividend payouts.   We test this prediction with the following hypothesis: 
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H3:  PCON firms with higher institutional shareholdings are associated with higher dividend 
payouts, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1   Sample  
We use a sample of 500 Malaysian publicly listed firms from the Compustat database 
for six years (2004 to 2009) (3,000 firm-years observation). Our sample covers firms from all 
industrial sectors and comprise of the consumer products, industrial products, trading and 
services, plantation, property, construction and technology sectors as shown in Panel B of 
Table 1. Consistent with Bliss & Gul (2012a); Gul (2006); Johnson & Mitton (2003), firms 
from the financial, regulated utilities, real estate investment funds (REITS) and closed-end 
funds sectors are not included in our sample. Our sample includes all survivors, new entries 
and exiting firms, resulting in an unbalanced panel. We imposed a further criterion whereby 
only firms with at least three years of observations over the study period are included. The final 
sample size after excluding firms with missing proxies of cash, sales and assets resulted in 
2,458 firms-year observations.  The data for the classifications of PCON firms are derived from 
the list of PCON firms in Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003). 11  The data on 
institutional investors’ shareholdings were hand-collected from the ‘top thirty shareholders list’ 
available in the annual reports of sample firms.  Financial data used to compute various 
                                               
11 The period of this study coincides with the tenure of the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, (His 
term as the Prime Minister lasted from 31 October 2003 – 3 April 2009) and he is the immediate successor of Mahathir 
Mohammad. It is expected that the ‘controlling insiders and the connected politicians’ identified in studies by Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) and Faccio et al. (2006) still continue to enjoy political patronage and influencing power in the country’s 
corporate scene. For instance, Mahathir Mohammad still continued to be one of the most powerful and prominent top 
politically linked leaders in the country at least until the year 2013 and as such, his associates and those with close ties with 




measures were extracted from the Compustat database. All continuous variables are winsorized 
to the 1 and 99 percentiles to control for extreme values. 
 
---Insert Table 1 here--- 
3.2 Measurement of variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variable(s) 
Consistent with prior dividend studies (e.g.  Choy et al., 2011; Barclay et al., 2009; La 
Porta et al., 2000), dividend is measured as: (1) dividend to total assets; (2) dividends to sales; 
(3) industry-adjusted dividends to total assets on a yearly basis, using the industry grouping 
classification of Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange). The choice to measure dividend 
using a number of different proxies is important to assess whether the results are sensitive to 
the commonly used measures of dividends. 
  
3.2.2 Independent variables  
3.2.2 (a)  PCON firms 
PCON firms are classified as a dummy variable. A firm is coded 1 if it is classified as 
PCON firm based on studies by Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003).  This study 
adopts the list of PCON firms by Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) as the study’s 
sample period covers from the years 2002 to 2009. Faccio (2006) and  Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) classify a firm as PCON if its controlling shareholders or top directors have family or 
business ties with top politicians or the ruling elite.12 
 
                                               
12 See Gul (2006), Faccio (2006) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) for a detailed list of PCON firms, showing the 
respective primary connected shareholder/director with their primary political connection. 
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3.2.2 (b) Institutional investors 
Consistent with prior studies, our measure of institutional investors is the fraction 
shareholding percentage of the top five institutional shareholders (INS) (Abdul Wahab et al., 
2008; Cornett et al., 2007; Hartzell & Starks, 2002). This data was hand collected from 30 
largest shareholders list as disclosed in the firm’s annual report and focuses only on five major 
institutional investors as other types of institutional investors hold insignificant amount of 
shareholdings in Malaysia. For the purpose of robustness, we also consider another stringent 
proxy for institutional investors (IndependentINS). IndependentINS is measured by the fraction 
of shareholding of institutional investors who do not have business relationship in investee 
firms and is consistent (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). 
3.2.3 Control variables 
The choice of control variables is driven by prior studies, which have found them to be 
significant factors in influencing the dividend decision. Consistent with prior studies such as 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar’s (2010), the lagged one-year of dividends is employed as a control 
variable, as firms attempt to maintain stable dividends over time (Lintner, 1965). Growth is the 
average growth rate of net sales in the previous five years ∑( Sales t /Sales t−1 for each of the 
last 5 years)/5, consistent with Choy et al. (2011) and is expected to negatively influence 
dividend payouts because firms with higher growth have lower free cash flow and hence pay 
lower dividends (Jensen, 1986).  
The proxy for earnings is measured as earnings divided by equity, in line with prior 
studies (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010; Truong & Heaney, 2007) and expected to positively 
influence dividend payouts because more profitable firms pay higher dividends. Similar to 
previous study such as  Farinha (2003) cash resource or cash holding is the five-year average 
of cash and cash equivalents is expected to have a positive influence on dividends as firms 
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holding high levels of cash experience higher agency costs and hence may use dividend policy 
to reduce these costs (Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). Firm size is measured by the natural log 
of the book value of the firm’s assets and is expected to positively influence dividends (Barclay 
et al., 2009). Debt is measured as total debt to total assets, consistent with Truong and Heaney 
(2007) and is expected to negatively influence dividends because debt also alleviates the 
agency costs of free cash flows (Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007). PERIOD is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the data is from the each of the fiscal years from 2004-2009. 
INDUSTRY_DUMMIES are indicator variables that equal 1 if the observation is from the each 
of the industry classification of Bursa Malaysia and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3 Regression model 
Since dividend payout is non-negative, the Tobit regression analysis is used and 
consistent with prior study such as Choy et al. (2011).The Tobit regression model used to test 
the hypotheses is as follows, with the tests variables in bold:   
 
Div =  α0 + α1LAGGED DIVit + α2SIZEit + α3CASHit + α4GROWTHit + α5ROEit + α6DEBTit 
+ α7PCONit + α8INSit + α9PCON*INSit +α10INDUSTRY_DUMMIESit + α11PERIODit+ ε  
 
Div  firm’s annual dividends divided by book value of assets (Div/ta); OR firm’s 
annual dividends divided by net sales (Div/sales); OR industry adjusted Div on 
a yearly basis using the industry grouping of the Bursa Malaysia (Ind Adj 
Div/ta) 13 
 
SIZE natural log of the book value of the firm’s assets 
CASH 5-year mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by total assets 
 
GROWTH   average growth rate of net sales in the previous 5 years;                              
              ∑( Sales t -Sales t−1 for each of the last 5 years)/5 
                                               
13 The industry adjusted Div/ta for each firm is obtained by subtracting the median of dividend rate of sample firms in the 
same industry and deflated by total assets, consistent with Faccio et al. (2001).   
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ROE earnings divided by equity 
DEBT total debt divided by total assets 
PCON indicator variable: 1 if the firm is politically connected and 0 otherwise 
INS  percentage ownership of the top 5 institutional investors in a firm 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
A breakdown of the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
are provided for the overall sample, PCON and non-PCON firms.  The sample resulted in 265 
(11%) firm-year observations with political connection and 2,193 (89%) firm-year 
observations without political connections. The breakdown of sample in terms of PCON vs. 
non-PCON observations is representative of the fraction of PCON firms listed in the Main 
Market of Bursa Malaysia, which is approximately 11%.  This is also comparable with prior 
Malaysian studies on political connection (See for e.g. Gul 2006). The mean values for Div/ta 
and Div/sales for the overall sample are 0.013 and 0.022 respectively. Div/ta and Div/sales are 
found to be slightly higher for PCON firms than non-PCON firms, although the mean is not 
significantly different for both types. This indifference maybe due to the fact that PCON firms 
are generally bigger in size and thus the magnitude of the dividend are bigger, as larger firms 
tend to pay higher dividends.  
Consistent with prior study (see How et al., 2014; Abdul Wahab et al. 2009), the presence 
of institutional shareholding is significantly higher in PCON firms relative to non-PCON firms  
In addition, PCON firms have significantly larger earnings on equity (ROE), DEBT and CASH 
as compared to their non-PCON counterparts. PCON firms also show significantly lower 
growth.  
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---Insert Table 2 here--- 
4.2   Correlations  
Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations for both PCON and non-PCON 
firms. Div/ta and Div/sales are significantly and positively correlated with INS, SIZE, CASH 
and ROE, and negatively correlated with DEBT (for non-PCON firms). PCON firms are 
significantly and positively correlated with INS and ROE and negatively with DEBT. Overall, 
more variables from non-PCON firms are significantly correlated with Div/ta and Div/sales 
than from PCON firms, using both the Pearson and Spearman correlations. 
 
---Insert Table 3 here--- 
4.3 Results  
Table 4 represents the empirical results of the Tobit regression with three separate 
models. Model (a) presents the regressions without the interaction term, while Model (b) 
includes the interaction PCON*INS and finally Model (c) tabulates the regressions that include 
PCON*IndependentINS. The coefficients of PCON in Model 1 are negative and statistically 
significant (Column 1, -0.003, t= -2.230, p<0.05; Column 2, -0.007, t=-2.410, p<0.005; 
Column 3, -0.003, t=-2.150, p<0.05) supporting the first hypothesis that PCON firms are 
associated with lower dividends, and consistent with Cao et al. (2012). This suggests that 
expropriation does occur in PCON firms, and may also suggest that investors in PCON firms 
are willing to accept lower dividends in the anticipation of getting other, less direct, privileges 
(Benerjee et al., 2007).  
Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between INS and dividends. The 
coefficients for INS and dividends are positive and significant (Column 1, 0.092; t=2.640, 
p<0.01; Column 2, 0.014, t=2.240 p<0.05; Column 3, 0.010, t=2.580 p<0.05). The result 
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supports hypothesis 2 that INS push for the distribution of higher dividends. This result 
corroborates the findings of La Porta et al. (2000) that in a common law country, all other 
things being equal, minority and other shareholders are able to influence firms to make higher 
dividend payouts.  
Model (b) introduces the interaction term between PCON and INS to test hypothesis 3. 
The coefficients of the interaction term are positive and significant (see Column 4, 0.053, 
t=2.100, p<0.05; Column 5, 0.076, t=2.160, p<0.05; Column 6, 0.005, t=2.280, p<0.05). This 
suggests that INS are able to pressure for higher dividends when the risk of expropriation is 
high in PCON firms. The result is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (2000) and 
How et al. (2014). In our analyses in subsequent tables, the industry adjusted dividends to total 
assets (Ind Adj Div/ta) is used as a proxy for dividend payouts. However our results remain 
robust when we use Div/ta or Div/sales.   
Institutional investors may differ in their ability to monitor management decisions. 
Following How et al. (2014), the analysis is extended to reflect the heterogeneity of the 
institutional investors in Malaysia. Independent institutional investors are ‘pressure resistant’ 
and consider monitoring to cost less than other types of institutional investor (Ferreira & Matos, 
2008). This classification is used to denote another variable (IndependentINS) to re-examine 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 and further validate our findings.14  
The coefficient of PCON is negative and significant (Column 7, -0.003, t=-2.170, 
p<0.05) while INS is positive and significant (Column 7, 0.063, t=2.070, p<0.05) in Model (c) 
of Table 4. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant (Column 8, 0.037, 
t=2.230 p<0.05). Overall the results using IndependentINS are consistent with the earlier 
                                               
14 Our definition of IndependentINS is the fraction of shareholding of institutional investors who do not have business 
relationship in investee firms and is consistent with the definition of Ferreira and Matos (2008). 
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findings in Model (a) and (b) with respect to the effects of PCON, INS and PCON*INS on 
dividends.  
 
---Insert Table 4 here--- 
 
4.4  Further analysis 
Conventional wisdom asserts that high-growth opportunity firms pay low or no dividends 
(Fama and French, 2001): stated differently, firms with high growth opportunities may have 
lower free cash flow and hence pay lower dividends (Jensen, 1986), specifically in common 
law countries (La Porta et al., 2000). Jensen (1986) suggests that agency conflicts are more 
likely to occur in firms with low growth opportunities. Consistent with Choy et al. (2011) 
growth opportunities are defined as the average growth rate of net sales in the previous 5 years, 
and firms are partitioned into low and high growth. The median growth for each year is 
calculated, and then firms are classified high or low, according to their growth rate. Finally, 
the low- and high-growth firms for all six years are combined. 
 
---Insert Table 5 here--- 
 
Table 5 presents the empirical results of the Tobit regression based on firm’s growth. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient for PCON is negative and significant with dividend (-
0.009, t=-2.26, p<0.05), suggesting that in firms with low growth, the agency cost of 
expropriation is higher, consistent with the conjecture of Jensen (1986). A significantly 
positive coefficient of INS with dividend (0.017, t=2.44, p<0.05) is observed; this suggests 
that INS prefer higher dividends when firm growth is low, as expected. The coefficient for the 
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interaction term between PCON and INS with dividend in column 2 is positive and significant 
(0.088, t=2.46, p<0.05), indicating that INS offset concerns of expropriation in PCON firms 
and implies  that institutional investors are able to exert power to compel the firms to disgorge 
higher dividends, limiting expropriation when growth opportunities are low.  
The analysis for high growth firms in Columns 3 and 4 indicates the coefficient of PCON 
is positive and insignificant, suggesting the risks of expropriation are not severe in PCON firms 
with high growth. Likewise, the coefficient of INS with dividend is  positive and insignificant, 
implying that institutional investors feel safe and opt for lower dividends in the anticipation of 
higher dividend payouts in the future, corroborating Faccio et al. (2001). Similarly, Column 4 
shows that the coefficient for the interactions term between PCON and INS is positive and 
insignificant, consistent with the conjecture by La Porta et al. (2000).  
Liquid assets withheld by firms have a private benefit option attached to them that other 
assets do not have to the same extent (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Controlling shareholders and 
insiders are unable to use these funds for personal interest if they are payable as dividends. In 
this regard cash resources or cash holdings retained by firms may raise concern in shareholders 
when the risk of expropriation is present, particularly if the holdings are high. A related 
argument by Jensen (1986) is that agency conflict over dividend payment is particularly severe 
when firms generate substantial free cash flows. In firms with low cash reserves, the 
opportunity for expropriation is limited and payment of dividends may strain the firm 
financially; accordingly, investors’ expectation of higher dividends is unlikely. Therefore, we 
re-examined firms with low and high cash reserves. The median of CASH for each year is 
calculated, providing a different median value for cash each year, and then firms with lower or 
higher cash than the median are classified as low or high cash firms. Finally, both the low and 
high cash firms for all six years are combined.  
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In Table 5, column 5 examines hypotheses 1 and 2 while Column 6 examines hypothesis 
3 for firms with low cash. The insignificant coefficients of PCON and INS in Column 5 is 
consistent with the prediction that low cash reduces the necessity to pay dividends and limits 
opportunities for expropriation. These findings corroborate the assertion of Pinkowitz et al. 
(2006) that firms will not transform their liquid assets into private benefits in such a way that 
they suffer from cash deficiency; accordingly the coefficient of the interaction term PCON*INS 
with dividend is not significant. The results for low cash firms are in stark contrast to high cash 
firms. In Column 7, the coefficient of PCON with dividend is negative and highly significant 
(-0.013, t=-3.91, p<0.01) while the coefficient of INS with dividend is also positive and 
significant (0.017, t=5.22, p<0.01). In Column 8, the interactions between PCON and INS 
shows a positive and highly significant effect (0.079, t=5.48, p<0.01) on dividends. These 
findings suggest that in PCON firms, expropriation occurs when there are high cash reserves. 
Institutional investors, anticipating higher expropriations in these circumstances, pressure for 
higher dividends to negate opportunities for expropriation, as Jensen (1986) suggests. The 
results presented above suggest that the severity of the agency cost of expropriation is higher 
in firms that experience low growth or hold high cash reserves.  
We next examine among sample firms that represent the extreme quartiles of high/low 
growth and high/low cash matrix. It is conjectured that in firms that experience low growth 
and possess high cash, the risk of expropriation will be high, holding other factors constant. 
Similarly, concern of expropriation should be low in firms that experience high growth and 
possess low cash. Based on the earlier definitions of high and low cash/growth, a reduced panel 
is examined by extracting two groups of sample firms to test these two propositions. The first 
group is ‘Low Growth and High Cash’ and the second ‘High Growth and Low Cash’. Column 
9 in Table 5 examines ‘Low Growth High Cash’ firms and shows that the coefficient of PCON 
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is negative and highly significant (-0.009, t=-8.45, p<0.001) with dividend. As expected, INS 
shows a positive and significant effect on dividend (0.090, t=2.18, p<0.05). The coefficient of 
interaction term of PCON*INS is, as expected, positive and significant (0.010, t=4.19, p< 
0.01). Column 10 examines ‘High Growth and Low Cash’ firms and finds insignificant 
coefficients for PCON, INS and the interaction term of PCON*INS. Overall these results 
indicate that the risk of expropriation and corresponding pressure by INS is high in PCON firms 
with low growth and high cash, and that their fears of expropriation and a preference for higher 
dividends are low in PCON firms with high growth and low cash. 
 
4.4.1   Investment decisions, political connections and institutional shareholdings 
In the preceding sections note that dividends payments and political connection does not 
show a significant and positive association, which if otherwise, could suggest that 
expropriation concerns are absent or low in PCON firms. Although PCON firms generally 
experience lower growth opportunities than non-connected firms (as shown in Table 2), these 
firms have an opportunity to undertake capital investments that could reduce the magnitude of 
cash resources available for dividends distribution. Arnott and Asness (2003) suggest that low 
dividend payout leads to inefficient empire building and the funding of below-ideal projects 
and investments. Higher investment invariably causes firms to grow beyond their optimal size 
and increases controlling shareholder/insider power by enlarging resources under their control 
(Jensen, 1986). First, we assess whether PCON firms have a positive/negative influence on a 
firm’s investment policy.  To differentiate monitoring effects and overvaluation effects, next 
we assess the influence of institutional investors on investment policy and the former’s effect 
in counterbalancing the effect of political connection on investment policy. Institutional 
investors are probably better off by receiving higher dividends than to endorse firms to invest 
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in higher investment, which neither necessarily guarantee good returns nor reduce likelihood 
of self-benefiting actions. However given that PCON firms are associated with lower dividend 
payouts, institutional investors could push for higher investments if the possibility of 
expropriation via other schemes like related party transactions and excessive perks, are higher 
as the former could be possibly viewed as less severe compared to the latter in terms of 
expropriation. We conjecture that higher investments would at least result in resources to be 
retained within firms, while other type of expropriating transactions mentioned here are 
probably worse off for shareholders because these transactions would channel resources out of 
the firm.15 Thus, in order to examine how PCON firms pursue investment policy in light of the 
lower dividend payouts associated in these firms, we examine firms’ investment decision in 
this section.  
 
---Insert Table 6 here--- 
 
Since prior literature view (1) dividends and capital expenditure (Gugler, 2003) and (2) 
dividends and institutional shareholding (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) as possibly jointly 
determined, the three stages least squares regression (3SLS) is employed. The system consists 
of dividends, capital expenditure (CAPEX) and institutional shareholding (INS) models. 
Following Jensen et al. (1992), Gugler (2003) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) the dividend 
                                               
15 Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that liquid assets (as compared to other assets such as physical assets) not returned to 
shareholders in the form of dividends can be turned into private benefits at lower cost.  
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payout system is modelled.  The CAPEX model follows Denis and Sibilkov (2009) and Gugler 
(2003). The INS model is adopted from (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) system.16  
 The dividend regressions using the 3SLS in Model 1 and 2 of Table 6 show similar 
results for INS, PCON and the interaction term of PCON*INS as our earlier obtained results in 
Table 2.  Model 3 shows the coefficient of Ind Adj Div/ta is negative and significant with 
CAPEX (-0.652, t=-5.58, p<0.01), consistent with Gugler (2003). The coefficient of PCON is 
negative and significant (-0.010, t=-1.97, p>0.05) while INS is positive and significant (0.002, 
t=11.63, p<0.01). Our results suggest political PCON firms do not show any incremental effect 
on capital expenditure.17 In Model 4 the interaction term PCON*INS shows a positive and 
significant coefficient (0.059, t=2.01, p<0.05).  One possible interpretation in relation to our 
findings is that, although PCON firms distribute lower dividends and have lower capital 
expenditure, the expropriation in these firms probably occurs via other schemes, through 
donations to fund the activities of their affiliated political party, and excessive perks and 
privileges. Institutional investors potentially realise these concerns and push for higher capital 
expenditure. 
 
4.5   Robustness checks 
To address the possible concerns regarding the quality of our data and analyses, we have 
conducted additional robustness checks. First, our univariate test reveals that there is 
                                               
15Dividend is a function of endogenous variables (CAPEX and INS) and a set of exogenous variables comprised of LAGGED 
Div, SIZE, CASH, ROE, DEBT, GROWTH, PCON, INDUSTRY_DUMMIES and PERIOD. The CAPEX model is identified by 
excluding some of the explanatory variables that determine the dividend model where CAPEX is a function of endogenous 
variables (Ind Adj Div/ta and INS) and a set of exogenous variables comprised of ROE, GROWTH, PCON, 
INDUSTRY_DUMMIES and PERIOD as Denis and Sibilkov (2009) explain current investment is determined by these 
variables only. The unreported INS model is a function of endogenous variable Ind Adj Div/ta and a set of exogenous variables 
comprised of GROWTH, SIZE, PCON, INDUSTRY_DUMMIES and PERIOD. Despite our best efforts, we cannot claim to 
have fully solved the issue of endogeneity.  
17 Interestingly, our results are contrary to Ferreira and Matos (2008) that studied 27 countries (excluding Malaysia).   
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insignificant relationship between the dividend distributed by PCON and non-PCON firms, 
however the regression finds that PCON firms pay lower dividends. We trust that this is 
attributed to the fact that PCON firms are generally larger than non-PCON firms and that our 
sample comprised of a random sample of 500 Malaysian publicly listed firms. To test this 
notion, we replicate all our analyses for large firms only to allay concerns of biasness in our 
sample. In an unreported univariate analysis of our sample by SIZE, we find that majority of 
our PCON firms’ SIZE are higher than the median of SIZE for the whole sample. However, 
our results remain unchanged in all our analyses that we repeated using a reduced panel that 
was made up of only large firms (i.e. observations above the median of SIZE). 
Second,  since Gristein and Michaely (2005) claimed that institutional 
shareholding might have a slower effect on dividends payout as they take 
time to affect a firm’ decision making, we re-examine our predictions  using 
the one year lagged value of the percentage institutional shareholding 
instead of the earlier measure of INS. The results remain unchanged.  
Third, a more stringent measure independent institutional shareholding 
(IndependentIns) was used in Table 4 to address the heterogeneity of 
institutional investors in Malaysia, we again run the estimates in Table 5 
and 6 replacing INS with IndependentIns.  Fourth, since we have included CAPEX in 
the dividend estimate using the 3SLS regressions in Table 6, we re-examine all the estimates 
reported in prior tables (refer to tables 4 and 5) by including CAPEX. In the many regressions 
with these alternate methods and specifications, the fundamental results for all the three 
hypotheses of this study remain unchanged.  
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5.  Conclusion 
Although much literature deals with dividends and their relation to the agency costs of 
expropriation, there is limited evidence in relation to political connections. Our study’s 
investigation of expropriation from the standpoint of dividends, although narrow in scope, 
presents quantitative evidence linking expropriation to firms with political connections. We 
show that institutional investors play a crucial and effective mitigating role in alleviating 
expropriation concerns in PCON firms by pressing for higher dividend payouts. This suggests 
that an increase in the level of shareholdings by institutional investors is likely to limit 
expropriation behaviour and enhance the value of PCON firms. 
This study suggests that expropriation of outside shareholders in PCON firms is a salient 
agency problem that may alert and guide regulators in formulating future regulations. It 
provides insight into the role of institutional investors in alleviating expropriation concerns in 
PCON firms. Corporate decision makers in such firms should be aware of the need for higher 
dividends as investors consider them effective in limiting the agency problem of expropriation 
and of the importance of attracting institutional investors in general. For policy makers, the 
finding that PCON firms are associated with lower dividends could justify initiatives to 
improve governance within these firms, while encouraging the participation of institutional 
investors will encourage higher dividends and limit expropriation. These findings are relevant 
for countries with an institutional environment similar to that of Malaysia, where corporate 
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Original sample size (500 firms - 6 years) 3,000 
Less:    
financial institutions, regulated utilities sectors, REITS and closed-end funds -180 
missing annual reports and sample without minimum 3 years of firm-year 
observations -109 
firms with zero or negative book value of total assets, cash  -253 
Final sample size (n) 2,458 
    
B: Distribution of sample by industry   
Plantation (7%) 166 
Construction (7%) 179 
Trading/ Services (22%) 542 
Property (3%) 84 
Industrial Products (40%) 980 
Consumer Products (17%) 418 
Technology (4%) 89 
    





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Full sample Non-PCON firms (N= 2,193) PCON firms (N = 265) t-test Mann-Whitney 
 Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median     
                
Div/ta 0.013 0.023 0.004  0.013 0.023 0.004  0.015 0.030 0.004 -0.928  -0.884  
Div/sales 0.022 0.042 0.005  0.022 0.042 0.005  0.025 0.039 0.009 -0.910  -1.090  
INS 15.515 16.228 10.527  15.741 18.141 10.447  16.44 14.479 12.742 -0.434  -1.761 * 
SIZE 2.548 0.576 2.463  2.516 0.5611 2.433  3.110 0.565 3.001 -11.830 *** -11.520 *** 
CASH 0.114 0.119 0.079  0.112 0.119 0.076  0.145 0.104 0.127 -3.043 *** -5.395 *** 
ROE 0.086 0.219 0.095  0.085 0.209 0.094  0.111 0.358 0.118 -1.328 ** -2.836 *** 
DEBT 0.420 0.207 0.418  0.414 0.205 0.411  0.527 0.211 0.538 -6.148 *** -4.891 *** 
GROWTH 0.118 0.463 0.068  0.123 0.465 0.070  0.040 0.413 0.030 1.991 ** 2.068 ** 
Div/ta = annual dividends divided by book value of assets. Div/sales = the annual dividends divided by net sales SIZE = natural log of the book value of firms’ assets. CASH = 5 year 
mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by total assets. GROWTH = average growth rate of net sales in previous 5 years. ROE = earnings divided by equity. DEBT = 
total debt divided by total assets. PCON is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm is politically connected; 0 otherwise. INS = the percentage ownership of the top 5 institutional investors 
in a firm. The column for t-test shows the t-statistics while Mann-Whitney shows the z-statistics for both samples, Non-PCON and PCON. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3: Correlations  
 
Variable Div/ta Div/ sales INS SIZE CASH ROE DEBT GROWTH CAPEX 
A: Pearson correlation        
Non-PCON firms (N = 2,193)        
Div/ta 1.000         
Div/sales 0.700*** 1.000        
INS 0.130*** 0.112*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.155*** 0.174*** 0.279*** 1.000      
CASH 0.363*** 0.364*** 0.128*** 0.006** 1.000     
ROE 0.322*** 0.173*** 0.100*** 0.233*** 0.155*** 1.000    
DEBT -0.302*** -0.380*** -0.030 0.135*** -0.442*** -0.038* 1.000   
GROWTH -0.035 -0.009 0.028 0.107** -0.005 0.196*** 0.054*** 1.000  
CAPEX -0.089*** -0.003* 0.085*** 0.127** -0.038 0.115*** 0.047** 0.073*** 1.000 
          
PCON firms (N = 265)         
Div/ta 1.000         
Div/sales 0.793*** 1.000        
INS 0.218*** 0.217*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.075 0.066 0.179** 1.000      
CASH 0.069 0.059 0.237** 0.325*** 1.000     
ROE 0.331*** 0.212*** 0.055 0.137* 0.096 1.000    
DEBT -0.211*** -0.336*** -0.116 0.312*** -0.069 -0.065 1.000   
GROWTH -0.001 -0.018 -0.039 0.249** -0.004 0.238*** 0.169** 1.000  
CAPEX -0.096 -0.131 0.241 0.029 -0.023 -0.006 -0.152 0.075 1.000 
          
B: Spearman correlation         
Non-PCON firms (N = 2,193)        
Div/ta 1.000         
Div/sales 0.953*** 1.000        
INS 0.180*** 0.183*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.246*** 0.256*** 0.273*** 1.000      
CASH 0.362*** 0.351*** 0.160*** 0.092*** 1.000     
ROE 0.417*** 0.346*** 0.137*** 0.339*** 0.213*** 1.000    
DEBT -0.380*** -0.418*** -0.046** 0.185*** -0.415*** -0.093 1.000   
GROWTH -0.197* -0.168* 0.088*** 0.176*** 0.057 0.344*** 0.060*** 1.000  
CAPEX -0.217 -0.169* 0.132*** 0.199*** 0.054 0.267*** 0.036*** 0.211*** 1.000 
          
PCON firms (N = 265)         
Div/ta 1.000         
Div/sales 0.937*** 1        
INS 0.332*** 0.293*** 1.000       
SIZE 0.134*** 0.254*** 0.279*** 1.000      
CASH 0.200*** 0.225*** 0.319*** 0.354*** 1.000     
ROE 0.304*** 0.286*** 0.011 0.264*** 0.230*** 1.000    
DEBT -0.465*** -0.408*** -0.121 0.159* -0.084 -103 1.000   
GROWTH -0.164 -0.154 0.001 0.253 -0.136 0.452*** 0.088 1.000  
CAPEX -0.413 -0.355 0.261*** 0.157 -0.021 0.235*** -0.165* 0.246*** 1.000 
 
Div/ta = annual dividends divided by book value of assets. Div/sales = annual dividends divided by net sales SIZE = natural log 
of the book value of firms’ assets. CASH = 5 year mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by total assets. GROWTH 
is the average growth rate of net sales in previous 5 years. ROE is earnings divided by equity. DEBT = total debt divided by total 
assets. PCON is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm is politically connected; 0 otherwise. INS = the percentage ownership of the top 
5 institutional investors in a firm. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 4: Political Connections, INS and Dividends 
 Without interactions ( Model a) 
 
With interactions ( Model b) 
 












Ind Adj Div/ta 
 
Ind Adj Div/ta 
 
Ind Adj Div/ta 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
                 
Intercept -0.039  -0.066  -0.030  -0.042  -0.071  -0.034  -0.006  -0.006   -5.460 *** -5.120 *** -3.380 *** -5.790 *** -5.520 *** -3.810 *** -2.680 *** -2.570 *** 
LAGGED Div 0.591  0.685  0.637  0.588  0.686  0.631  0.508  0.508   14.540 *** 16.890 *** 12.690 *** 14.470 *** 16.910 *** 12.570 *** 16.560 *** 16.550 *** 
SIZE 0.014  0.027  0.013  0.013  0.027  0.013  0.005  0.005   11.220 *** 11.830 *** 7.870 *** 11.150 *** 11.780 *** 7.780 *** 6.900 *** 6.940 *** 
CASH 0.030  0.068  0.033  0.030  0.069  0.033  0.044  0.044   5.180 *** 6.390 *** 4.480 *** 5.250 *** 6.440 *** 4.510 *** 10.570 *** 10.610 *** 
ROE 0.104  0.109  0.142  0.103  0.107  0.141  0.024  0.024   21.740 *** 12.400 *** 20.860 *** 21.580 *** 12.250 *** 20.780 *** 12.470 *** 12.440 *** 
DEBT -0.079  -0.139  -0.118  -0.078  -0.138  -0.117  -0.021  -0.021   -18.420 *** -17.550 *** -17.690 *** -18.280 *** -17.440 *** -17.610 *** -8.790 *** -8.790 *** 
GROWTH -0.003  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002   -2.080 ** -3.390 *** -2.090 ** -2.030 ** -2.440 ** -2.040 ** -2.240 ** -2.240 ** 
PCON -0.003  -0.007  -0.003  -0.009  -0.015  -0.010  -0.003  -0.001   -2.230 ** -2.410 ** -2.150 ** -2.340 ** -2.130 ** -2.360 ** -2.170 ** -2.120 ** 
INS 0.092  0.014  0.010  0.088  0.014  0.010      
 2.640 *** 2.240 *** 2.580 ** 2.550 ** 2.170 ** 2.280 **     
IndependentINS             0.063  0.007  
                2.070 ** 2.290  ** 
PCON*INS       0.053  0.076  0.005      
       2.100 ** 2.160 ** 2.280 **     
PCON*INS( Independent)               0.037  
               2.230 ** 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
X² 1311.42  1279.04  1075.05  1315.84  1282.00  1078.23  1032.43  1089.43  
N 2458  2458  2458  2458  2458  2458  2458  2458  
Div/ta = annual dividends divided by book value of assets, Div/sales = annual dividends divided by net sales; Ind Adj Div/ta = the industry adjusted Div/ta on a yearly basis using the industry grouping of the Malaysian Stock Exchange. 
LAGGED Div = lagged one-year value of the corresponding Div/ta, Div/sales or Ind Adj Div/ta. SIZE = natural log of the book value of the firms’ assets. CASH = the 5 year mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by 
total assets. GROWTH = average growth rate of net sales in previous 5 years. ROE = earnings divided by equity. DEBT = total debt divided by total assets. PCON is an indicator variable, 1 if the firm is politically connected; 0 otherwise. 
INS = the percentage ownership of the top 5 INS in a firm. IndependentINS = the fraction of shareholding of INS who do not have business relationship in investee firms. t-values are reported under the coefficient estimates, where ***, 
**and* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Please not that that Model 1 represents the experimental variables with all control variables, Model 2 includes the interactions effect between PCON and INS. Model 3 uses IndependentINS, a more stringent proxy of INS replacing the 




Effect of PCON and INS on dividend by GROWTH and CASH 
 














 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Intercept -0.041  -0.055  -0.214  -0.039  -0.011  -0.009  -0.203  -0.192  -0.002  -0.007   -2.460 ** -2.610 *** -167.200 *** -2.440 ** -0.620  -0.510  -119.230 *** -112.990 *** -0.320  -0.780  
LAGGED Div 0.615  0.609  0.799  0.791  1.022  0.970  0.582  0.576  0.516  0.577   6.580 *** 6.330 *** 72.460 *** 5.500 *** 7.400 *** 7.250 *** 58.280 *** 58.140 *** 9.940 *** 8.180 *** 
SIZE 0.019  0.019  0.014  0.014  0.011  0.011  0.018  0.017  0.003  0.008   5.540 *** 5.460 *** 31.430 *** 4.270 *** 1.660 * 1.680 * 30.300 *** 30.090 *** 2.560 ** 4.520 *** 
CASH 0.040  0.040  0.037  0.037  0.241  0.234  0.037  0.038  0.007  0.033   2.840 *** 2.840 *** 10.880 *** 2.040 ** 2.040 ** 2.010 ** 8.040 *** 8.290 *** 2.260 ** 1.930 ** 
ROE 0.181  0.181  0.200  0.198  0.198  0.199  0.194  0.193  0.069  0.013   8.980 *** 9.040 *** 59.340 *** 8.560 *** 4.570 ** 4.610 *** 41.230 *** 40.940 *** 13.150 *** 5.100 *** 
DEBT -0.158  -0.157  -0.168  -0.167  -0.170  -0.171  -0.159  -0.158  -0.024  -0.023   -9.890 *** -9.860 *** -55.460 *** -7.850 *** -5.750 *** -5.780 *** -37.610 *** -37.390 *** -5.440 *** -4.990 *** 
GROWTH -0.008  -0.008  -0.007  -0.007  -0.002  -0.001  -0.010  -0.010  -0.002  -0.001   -1.990 ** -2.000 ** -3.470 *** -3.710 *** -0.280  -2.240 ** -11.670 *** -11.410 *** -2.040 ** -2.920 *** 
PCON -0.009  -0.022  0.003  -0.008  -0.014  -0.098  -0.013  -0.025  -0.009  0.003   -2.260 ** -2.180 ** 0.310  -0.520  -1.140  -0.050  -3.910 *** -3.850 *** -8.450 *** 0.580  
INS 0.017  0.016  0.020  0.020  0.021  0.020  0.017  0.016  0.090  0.063   2.440 ** 2.300 ** 1.040  1.130  1.510  1.380  5.220 *** 5.020 *** 2.180 ** 1.430  
PCON*INS   0.088    0.062    0.001    0.079  0.010  -0.033     2.460 **   0.680    1.330    5.480 *** 4.190 *** -0.890                       
PERIOD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY_
DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                     
X² 1219.42  1182.43  1231.79  1209.93  1029.97  1185.32  1265.42  1284.91  1194.74  1154.93  
N 1,229  1,229  1,229  1,229  1,229  1,229  1,229  1,229  501  422  
LAGGED Div = lagged one year value of Ind Adj Div/ta. SIZE = natural log of the book value of firms’ assets.  CASH 5-year mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by total 
assets. GROWTH = average growth rate of net sales in previous 5 years. ROE = earnings divided by equity. DEBT = total debt divided by total assets. PCON is an indicator variable, 1 if the 
firm is politically connected; 0 otherwise. INS = the percentage ownership of the top 5 INS in a firm. T-values are reported under the coefficient estimates, where ***, ** and * denote 




Effect of PCON and INS on dividend and CAPEX with the 3SLS 
 Ind Adj Div/ta Ind Adj Div/ta CAPEX CAPEX 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept -0.009  -0.008  0.002  0.026  
 -3.390 *** -3.000 *** 2.700 *** 4.260 *** 
Ind Adj Div/tA     -0.652  -0.767  
     -5.580 *** -6.280 *** 
LAGGED Div 0.472  0.473      
 15.580 *** 15.610 ***     
CAPEX -0.089  -0.055      
 -2.170 ** -1.750 *     
SIZE 0.003  0.002      
 2.350 ** 2.750 **     
CASH 0.039  0.040      
 7.350 *** 7.500 ***     
ROE 0.025  0.024  0.023  0.027  
 11.990 *** 11.530 *** 4.080 *** 4.650 *** 
DEBT -0.017  -0.017      
 -7.440 *** -7.440 ***     
GROWTH -0.001  -0.001  0.003  0.004  
 -2.070 ** -1.770 * 2.180 ** 2.430 ** 
PCON 0.035  -0.005  -0.010  -0.005  
 -1.960 ** -1.910 ** -1.970 ** -2.130 ** 
INS 0.036  0.033  0.002  0.003  
 1.980 ** 1.810 * 11.630 *** 12.400 *** 
PCON*INS   0.063    0.059  
   3.070 ***   2.010 *** 
        
 
PERIOD Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDUSTRY_DUMMIES Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
        
 
N 2458  2458  2458  2458  
R² 0.225  0.262  0.074  0.077  
         
Table 6 reports a series of three-stage-least squares regressions with Ind Adj Div/ta as the dependent variable. The sample period is 
from 2004 to 2009. LAGGED Div is the one year lagged value of Ind Adj Div/ta,. SIZE is the natural log of the book value of the 
firms’ assets. CASH represents the five-year mean of the ratio of cash plus cash equivalents deflated by total assets. GROWTH is the 
average growth rate of net sales in previous five years. ROE is earnings divided by equity. DEBT is total debt divided by total assets. 
CAPEX is capital expenditure deflated by total assets. PCON is an indicator variable, which equals to 1 if the firm is politically 
connected and 0 if otherwise.  INS is the percentage ownership of the top 5 INSin a firm. The instruments for the dividend equation 
are LAGGED Div, SIZE, CASH, ROE, DEBT, GROWTH, PCON, industry dummies, year dummies; with an additional instrument - 
PCON*INS for the moderating regression. The instruments for the CAPEX equation are SIZE, ROE, GROWTH, PCON, industry 
dummies and year dummies; with an additional instrument - PCON*INS for the moderating regression. The instruments for the 
unreported INS equation are SIZE, GROWTH, PCON, industry dummies and year dummies.  Both the rank and the sufficient order 
conditions are satisfied. Z-values are reported under the coefficient estimates, where ***, **&* =denote the statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% & 10% levels, respectively. 
